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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether Petitioners have demonstrated a compelling reason
for this Court to grant certiorari.
Whether the Court of Appeals and the district court
correctly affirmed the administrative law judge's
determination that the Utah State Medicaid plan complies
with federal Medicaid law.
Whether the Court of Appeals and the district court
correctly affirmed the administrative law judge's decision
to exclude evidence concerning Weber Memorial's individual
facility cost data at the administrative hearing.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners are the previous owner and manager of a
nursing home facility in Royf Utah.

For conveniencef they will

be referred to jointly as Weber Memorial.

Respondent is the

state agency charged with administering a cooperative federalstate medical assistance program commonly called Medicaid.
In 1983, Petitioners requested an administrative
hearing to challenge the method of reimbursement by which they
received payment for services given to Medicaid eligible
individuals in their facility.

Petitioner claims that the state

must pay all reasonable costs which they incurred in providing
medical assistance.
Prior to 1980 , the state was required by federal law to
reimburse nursing homes for their "reasonable costs."

In 1980,

however, Congress enacted supplemental Medicaid legislation
commonly referred to as the Boren Amendment.

The new legislation

allows the states to pay providers according to predetermined
rates that "are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which
must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated
providers

..."
Consequentlyf the Department of Health developed a

"modified flat rate" whereby all providers in the state are paid
one rate plus a differential for property costs.

The rate

operates as the department's definition of an economically and
efficiently operated facility.
The administrative law judge held four full days of
hearings, howeverf pursuant to a motion made by the Department

-vi-

the hearing officer excluded proof of Weber Memorial's individual
costs because they were irrelevant.

The administrative law judge

ruled that the Utah Medicaid plan complied with federal and state
law on May 20, 1985.

His proposed Findings of Facts and

Conclusions of Law were adopted in a Final Determination issued
by the Executive Director of the Department of Health on June 4,
1985.
Petitioners appealed from that decision to the Third
District Court of Utah.

The case was heard by Judge Fisher, who

issued a Memorandum Opinion on June 3, 1986 upholding the hearing
officer's determination.

Final judgment was entered August 4,

1986 by Judge Scott Daniels following Judge Fisher's retirement
from the bench.
Petitioners next appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.
On March 15, 1988 Judge Bench writing for the panel which
included Judge Garff and Davidson, again affirmed the final
determination of the executive director.
Petitioner now requests this court to grant certiorari
to again review the administrative decision.

-vii-

ARGUMENT
Point I; Petitioners have not
demonstrated a compelling reason
for this Court to grant certiorari,
Weber Memorial has had the benefit of two courts
separately scrutinizing the administrative decision made in this
case.

Each court has rejected Petitioner's arguments and upheld

the administrative action.

Petitioner has not pointed to any

error in either the district court's or the Court of Appeal's
decisions which would support its request for this court to grant
certiorari.

In addition, the usual considerations governing

review by a writ of certiorari are absent.
The district court reviewed the Executive Director's
decisions as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 23-26-2 (1987) and
found that the administrative decision was supported by
sufficient evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious.

The

petitioners' underlying complaint is that they are not pleased
with the previous courts' adverse decisions.

They continue to

allege that the district court applied the wrong standard of
review by citing general case law applied by appellate courts.
What petitioners have refused to recognize is that specific
statutory enactments override all the general case law on the
issue.

In this case, the district court's standard of review of

a final determination by the executive director is specified,
"[tlhe court shall review the record and may alter the final
determination only upon a finding that the final determination is
capricious, or not supported by the evidence."

-1-

Utah Code Ann. §

26-23-2(3) (1987).

The district courtf therefore, reviewed the

record and memoranda on file and found that the final decision of
the executive director was not capricious but supported by
sufficient evidence. Weber Memorial v, Department of Health,
C85-4268 Minute entry on June 2 f 1986 , Addendum A.
Petitioner next appealed to the Court of Appeals which
treated the case as if the appeal had come directly from the
agency.

They applied a correction of error standard, giving no

deference to the expertise of the agency.

Technomedical Labs,

Inc., v. Utah Securities Division, 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987).
This standard of review is the same standard applied by this
court as enunciated in Bennion v. Utah State Board of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 675 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1983).
The Court of Appeals found that

ki

the modified flat rate

plan for Medicaid reimbursement is in full compliance with
federal and state law.

The final determination of the executive

director was not capriciousf but amply supported by the
evidence."

Weber Memorial v. Utah Department of Health, 86342-CA

(March 1987), Addendum B.

Petitioner points to no error

committed by the Court of Appealsf neither do they allege the
development of new case law or new information which would prompt
this court to review their arguments which have been repeatedly
rejected as meritless.
An administrative law judge first heard this case which
included four full days of testimony by numerous witnessesf
generating four volumes of transcript totalling over 787 pages.
In additionf seven depositions were admitted as evidence.

-2-

Petitioners have not only had their "day in court," but two
separate appellate reviews of the administrative action.

There

is no reason for this court to now accept certiorari on this
case.
POINT II; The Court of Appeals
and the district court correctly
affirmed the administrative law
judge's determination that the
Utah State Medicaid plan complies
with federal Medicaid law.
Medicaid Background
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 USC § 1396 et
seq.f commonly known as the Medicaid Actf establishes a
cooperative relationship in which federal and state government
share the costs of medical services to certain needy individuals
"whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs
necessary medical services."

42 USC § 1396 (1974).

If the state elects to participate in the Medicaid
Program, it must establish a ustate plan" for medical assistance
which complies with statutory and regulatory requirements under
the act.

42 USC § 1396(b).

See also 42 USC § 1396A(a)(l)

through (44) (1974); 42 CFR § 447 et seq.

State plans are

developed through state administrative rulemaking procedures and
any changes or amendments thereto must undergo the same
procedures and approval as before adoption.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-

46a-l to -16 (1987) .
After a state draws up a medical assistance plan
consistent with guidelines contained in the Medicaid Act and the
regulations promulgated thereunder, it must submit the plan to
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), an agency of the
-3-

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), for approval.

If

HCFA approves the plan, the state becomes eligible for federal
matching funds for reimbursement of the cost of medical
assistance.

42 USC § 1396B(a).

In 1980, Congress enacted supplemental Medicaid
legislation known as the Boren Amendment which was part of an
"Omnibus Reconciliation Act."

Prior to 1980, Medicaid plans were

required by federal law to reimburse nursing homes for their
"reasonable costs.11

Section 962 of the Omnibus Reconciliation

Act deleted the previous requirement that state agencies pay for
long term care facility services on a ''reasonable cost" basis.
Instead, the new legislation allows states to pay providers
through the use of predetermined rates that "are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently
and economically operated providers . . . ." Compare 42 USC §
1396A 13E (enacted in 1976) (Addendum C ) f with 42 USC §
1396A(a)(13)(A) (replacing the earlier section in 1980) (Addendum
D).
STATE MODIFIED FLAT RATE
In 1981, following the change in federal law mentioned
above, the Utah legislature directed the Department of Health to
establish a flat-rate committee to develop a method of payment
for nursing homes that would foster cost containment and assure
recipients of high quality care. After considering various
alternatives, the rate committee developed a modified flat-rate
method of nursing home reimbursement based on several factors.
The modified flat-rate methodology was submitted through the
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rulemaking process for public comment, and public hearing.
Sharon Wasek at pp. 312-313.

Tr.r

Pursuant to federal lawf the

Department of Health made findings and assurances to the
Secretary of HHS that the flat rate methodology was "reasonable
and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by
efficiently and economically operated providers.1'
447.253(b)(1).

42 C.F.R. §

That flat rate methodology was approved and

certified by HHS as meeting all requirements of federal law and
regulation.

The flat rate methodology was then adopted by

rulemaking into law effective July l f 1981.
Health care providers who accept Medicaid patients are
paid a statewide flat rate fee per patient day according to the
classification of such patient.

The flat rate is modified by a

"property differentialf" unique to each providerf to account for
wide variations in property costs.

The flat rate is also

adjusted annually to account for inflation and other factors.
Two months after the effective date of the flat rate in
September 1981f Mr. Don Bybee (who owns both plaintiff
corporations) purchased Weber Memorial Care Center.

In 1983,

Weber Memorial requested a hearing before the Department of
Health to challenge the modified flat rate system on the basis
that Weber Memorial was an "efficiently and economically
operated11 facility and therefore entitled to have all
"reasonable" costs met.
Petitioner's based their claim on the language in Title
XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(13)(A) which
provides:

-5-

A State plan for medical assistance must
provide for payment . . . of the hospitalf
skilled nursing facilityf and intermediate
care facility services provided under the
plan through the use of rates (determined in
accordance with methods and standards
developed by the State . . .) which the
State finds, and makes assurances
satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable
and adequate to meet the costs which must be
incurred by efficiently and economically
operated facilities in order to provide care
and services in conformity with applicable
State and Federal laws, regulationsf and
quality and safety standards . . . .
(Emphasis added).

Petitioners argue that this provision requires

the Department of Health to scrutinize the costs incurred by
Weber Memorial Care Center and to pay them their reasonable
costs.

Petitioners in essence would have the state ignore the

1980 change brought by the Omnibus Reconciliation Actf (Public
Law 96-499).

This position has been rejected by the

administrative hearing officer, the district court and the Court
of Appeals.
A plain reading of the statute and indeed the enacting
Senate interpretation (See Addendum E ) , allow the state to set a
rate of reimbursement which is reasonable and adequate to meet
the costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities as
a class.

The modified flat rate does just that and completely

reimburses the costs of over 90% of the long care facilities in
the state. Most of those facilities also realize a profit.

To

embrace Petitioner's arguments would require the state to
reimburse nursing homes according to the state's pre-1980
methodology/ a position which has been rejected by many other
courts.

Halo Care Centers v. Utah Department of Health, C-83-
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4654 (Utah 3rd Dist. Ct. 1985); Marv Washington Hospital. Inc. v.
Fisher, 635 F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985); Coalition of Michigan
Nursing Homes, Inc. v. Dempsey, 537 F. Supp. 451 (D.C. Mich.
1982); See also Mississippi Hospital Association, Inc. v.
Heckler, 701 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1983).
Petitioner's allegation that the state failed to comply
with other federal requirements has likewise been rejected as
meritless.

(See Weber Memorial v. Utah Department of Health,

86342-CA (March 1987) Addendum B which is hereby incorporated by
reference.)
Point III: The Court of Appeals and the
district court correctly affirmed the
administrative law judge's decision to
exclude evidence concerning Weber Memorial's
individual facility cost data. Thus,
Petitioners received a full and fair hearing.
In the course of the administrative hearing, Weber
Memorial sought to introduce detailed evidence as to its facility
costs, for the purpose of proving that the facility was being
operated in an economical and efficient manner.

The agency

responded with a motion to exclude such evidence as irrelevant.
The administrative law judge made a ruling that based on the 1980
Boren Amendment, the specific costs of Weber Memorial were
irrelevant.

It is this ruling that Petitioners claim prevented

them from receiving a full and fair hearing held in a "meaningful
manner."

As previously discussed, the Boren Amendment amended

the "reasonable cost" standard of reimbursement and replaced it
with a statute giving more flexibility to the states to establish
state wide rates of reimbursement.

Thus, Weber Memorial's costs

were irrelevant to the hearing and irrelevant evidence need not
be admitted in order to have a "meaningful" hearing.
-7-

Under Utah lawf an administrative law judge has the
authority to "administer oaths, examine witnesses, and issue in
the name of the department (of Health) notice of the hearings or
subpoenas requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production
of evidence relevant to any matter in the hearing."
Ann. § 26-23-2(1) (1987) (emphasis added).

Utah Code

See also Utah Admin.

Code R455-14-KA) ( 9) ( i) ( 5) (1987) .
The administrative law judge explained his ruling:
Because the "Modified Flat Rate" is applied
uniformly statewide, and is the standard by
which all nursing homes are measured, it was
not necessary to examine the specific costs
of Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. to
determine if it could be more efficiently and
economically operated and that was not done.
Weber Memorial Care Center v. Dept. of Health, ALJ Recommended
Decision, May 20f 1985.

(Addendum F ) .

The executive director of the Department of Health
adopted the Recommended Decision (Addendum G) and both the
district court and Court of Appeals independently concluded that
the executive director's final determination on this issue was
not capricious, but supported by the evidence.
CONCLUglQN
In summaryf Petitioner's arguments have been repeatedly
reviewed and rejected by the lower courts and they fail to
advance any compelling reasons why this Court should grant
certiorari.

Both the district court and Court of Appeals have

found that the modified flat rate plan for Medicaid reimbursement
is in full compliance with federal and state law and that the
administrative determination was supported by the evidence.
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Therefore,

t h i s Court should r e j e c t

Petitioner's

request

for

certiorari.
Respectfully

s u b m i t t e d t h i s 1 6 t h day of May, 1 9 8 8 .

RtlTti LYBB ERT^ENLUND
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
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t h a t I mailed four
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t r u e and
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In O p p o s i t i o n t o P e t i t i o n f o r

Writ

of C e r t i o r a r i from D e c i s i o n of C o u r t of A p p e a l s t o W i l l i a m
Downes, J r . ,

WINDER & HASLAM, 175 West 200 S o u t h ,

# 4 0 0 4 , P . O . Box

2 6 6 8 , S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h 84110-2668 and t o Donald W. L o j e c k ,
LOJECK AND HALL, CTD. , P . O . Box 1 7 1 2 , B o i s e , I d a h o 83701 on
t h e 1 6 t h day of May, 1 9 8 8 .

OuA /^

-9-

this

ADDENDUM

A

DAVID L. WILKINSON (3472)
Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS (1018)

Division Cnief
CLARK C. GRAVES (4216)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: 533-7642

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In re: WEBER MEMORIAL CARE
CENTER, INC. ana CHARTHAM
MANAGEMENT, INC.,

:
:
(

PINAL JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs/Appellants :
vs.

:
Civil No. C-85-4268

OTAfi DEPARTMENT OP HEALTH,
DIVISION OP HEALTH CARE
PINANCIMG

:
:
:

Defendants/Appellees, J
This case comas to the District Court from an
Administrative Decision in favor of the agency.

The

Administrative Law Judge made extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law following a trial on the merits. The
Executive Director of the Utah Health Department issued a final
determination consistent with the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law recommended by the Hearing Officer, and hence,
our review is limited to a review of the record to determine
whether the final decision of the agency was "capricious, or not
^ .... 4.W . . . ^ « « • lira H.5U5(J) (1953. as amended

1981).

The Court finds that the Executive Director's final

determination was supported by a residuum of legally admissible
evioence in the record and was not arbitrary or capricious.
Judgment, accordingly, for Defendant, the Utah Department of
Health.
DATED this

day of

, 1986.

JUDGE PRESIDING
SUBMITTED this

day of

, 1986.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true ana exact copy of
the foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
postage prepaid, to the following:
Donald W. Lojek
LOJEK 4 PENLAND
Attorneys for Weoer Memorial
Care Center
P.O. Box 199
Boise, Idaho 81701

William Downes, J r .
419 fcofctoa EuiLdicv}
Salt Lake City, Utah
on t h i s the .jJSlJ-**?

o£

-f?tt

84111
<iim¥

» 1**6.
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ADDENDUM

B

~ •*i -•\

RE: r *
IN THE UTAH COURT OP A P P E A R

^ R \$ p4 56

OOOOO

U'tA • •- ATU'fcr.. ^ kt-.N:
Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc.*
and Chertham Management* Inc.*
Plaintiffs and Appellants*

Utah Department of Health*
Division of Health Care Financing*

OPINION
(For Publication)
Case Ho. 860342-CA

Defendant and Respondent.

_JEJ LED

Before Judges Bench* Carff and Davidson.

BENCH* Judge:

O«**?«»C0*T

Plaintiffs appeal from the final judgment of a trial court
affirming the final determination of the executive director of
the Utah Department of Health (Department). We affirm.
Title XIX of the Social Security Act* 42 U.S.C. S 1396
(1983)* commonly referred to as the Medicaid Act* establishes a
cooperative relationship in which the federal and state
governments share the costs of medical services to the needy. If
a state elects to participate* it must establish a state plan
which complies with statutory and regulatory requirements under
the Medicaid Act. Prior to 1980, states participating in the
Medicaid program were required to reimburse health care providers
for their 'reasonable costs." Typically* a provider would submit
an accounting of its costs to the Department. The Department
would then review these costs on a case by case* charge by charge
basis and reimburse those costs deemed reasonable. In 1980*
Congress amended the Medicaid Act to allow a flat rate system of
reimbursement. Subsection 1396(a)(13)(A)* commonly referred to
as the Boren Amendment* now provides:
A State plan for medical assistance swst
provide for payment • • • of the hospital*
•killed nursing facility* and intermediate
care facility services provided under the
lan through the use of rates (determined
n accordance with Methods and standard!
developed by the Stat* • • •) which the

r

State finds, and makes assurances
satisfactory to the Secretary, are
reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities in order
to provide care and services in conformity
with applicable State and Federal laws,
regulations, and quality and safety
standards • . . .
Defendant Department is the state agency responsible for
administering the Medicaid program in Utah. In 1981, in
response to the Boren Amendment and the urging of the Utah
Health Care Association, the state legislature directed the
Department to organize a committee to develop and propose a
flat rate plan for reimbursement under the Medicaid program.
Under the plan proposed by the committee, patients who qualify
for Medicaid assistance are classified according to the degree
of care needed* The health care provider is then paid a
statewide flat rate fee per patient per day according to the
classification of such patient. The flat rate is modified by a
•property differential," unique to each provider, to account
for wide variations in property costs. The flat rate is also
adjusted annually to account for inflation and other factors.
The proposed plan was submitted through the statutory
rulemaking process. A public hearing was held, and no
objection was voiced from the health care industry. The plan
was then submitted to the United States Department of Health
and Human Services which certified that the plan satisfied all
requirements of the law and that all assurances submitted under
the requirements of the Medicaid Act were acceptable. The
modified flat rate plan became effective July 1, 1981.
Plaintiff Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. (Weber Memorial)
is a long-term health care provider. In September 1981, Weber
Memorial acquired the subject facility from Weber County.
Plaintiff Chartham Management, Inc. manages the facility
pursuant to a contract with Weber Memorial. In 1983, Weber
Memorial requested a hearing before the Department to challenge
the application of the modified flat rate plan and the
classification of patients* Prior to the hearing, the
Department filed a motion asking the hearing officer to rule,
•s a matter of law, that the state plan did not violate federal
law and that the plan did not require an examination of Weber
Memorials costs nor a determination whether this particular
facility is efficiently and economically operated. The hearing
officer granted the Departmentfs motion. Consequently, at the
administrative hearing which commenced August 3, 1984, Weber

Memorial was not permitted to Introduce evidence of Its costs
nor attempt to prove it is efficiently end economically
operated.
In his proposed findings, conclusions, and decision, the
hearing officer concluded the modified flat rate plan complied
with all provisions of federal and state law, and the
Department did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary
to law in the development, implementation, and operation of the
plan. The executive director of the Department adopted the
hearing officer's findings in her final determination dated
June 4, 1985. Weber Memorial filed a petition for review in
the Third District Court.1. In a memorandum decision and
final judgment, the trial court affirmed, finding "the
Executive Director's final determination was supported by a
residuum of legally admissible evidence in the record and was
not arbitrary or capricious." Keber Memorial appeals from the
trial court's final judgment.
When a trial court reviews an administrative decision and
the court's judgment is challenged on appeal, this Court
reviews the administrative decision as if the appeal had come
directly from the agency. Technomedical Labs. Inc. v. Utah
Securities Division. 744 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1987). Therefore,
it is not necessary to address Weber Memorial's contention that
the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. When
reviewing an administrative agency's interpretation of general
questions of law, including acts of Congress, "this Court
applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to
the expertise of the [agency]." Utah Deo't of Admin. Servs. v.
Public Serv. Conffl'a. (S8 P.2d §01, 608 (Utah 1983).
On appeal, Weber Memorial first argues that contrary to the
executive director's final determination, the modified flat
rate plan does not comply with federal law and regulations.
Section 1396(a)(13)(A) requires the state to find that the
rates, which are to be determined by methods and standards
developed by the state, reasonably end adequately meet the
Tl Under the new Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann.
fS C3-46b-l through -21 (1917) (effective January 1, 1988), the
district courts have jurisdiction to review by trisl de novo
§11 flnsl agency action resulting from informal adjudicative
roceedings, while the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, es
esignated by statute, has jurisdiction to review all final
•gency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
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costs of efficiently and economically operated facilities. The
state must also make satisfactory assurances to the federal
Department of Health and Human Services. Weber Memorial
contends the Department failed to make the necessary findings
and assurances that the rates satisfy the statutory
requirements. fi££ 42 C.F.R. S 447.253 (1985); Mary Washington
Hospital. Inc. v. Fisher, 635 F.Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(federal law does not require written findings).
The committee organized by the Department consisted of a
representative from the legislature, a legislative analyst, the
president and executive director of the Utah Health Care
Association, and a nursing home operator. Prior to selecting
the modified flat rate plan, the committee considered several
alternative methods of reimbursement. The committee based its
rate determinations on 1) the most recent information on the
actual costs being incurred by the nursing home industry in the
aggregate, as reported by each facility on its 1980 •facility
cost profile"; 2) a comparison with the rates paid by other
states in the region; 3) input from the Utah Health Care
Association; 4) a trending factor on the historical costs as
recommended by a consulting firm retained by the state; 5) a
comparison with 1976 rates, as adjusted for inflation; 6) the
legislative budget allocation;2 and 7) discussions and
interactions between committee members. Pursuant to statute,
the Department submitted to the Secretary of the federal
Department of Health and Human Services its assurances that the
rate reasonably and adequately meets the costs of efficiently
and economically operated facilities. The Secretary certified
the assurances as satisfactory.
A reasonable basis existed for the Department to find the
proposed rates were reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
of an efficiently and economically operated facility.
Hinety-three percent of all long-terra health care facilities in
Utah were shown to be meeting their costs under the modified
flat rate plan, with i majority showing a profit. We conclude
the Department developed reasonable methods and standards to
determine the rates. The modified flat rate plan therefore
complies with federal law.
2. Weber Memorial claims the rates were based to an
impermissible extent on the budget factor. The budget
allocation was clearly only one of several factors considered
by the committee.

Weber Memorial next argues that, even if the modified flat
rate plan is valid, the hearing officer erred in refusing to
• How Weber Memorial to submit evidence of its costs and proof
of its efficient and economic operation. Prior to the hearing,
the Department filed a motion to exclude as irrelevant all
evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and operation
The hearing
officer granted the motion. Weber Memorial claims the hearing
officer's ruling was contrary to law and a denial of its right
to a fair hearing,
Utah Code Ann, § 26-23-2(1) (1987) states:
In any such hearing, the hearing officer
shall have authority to administer oaths,
examine witnesses, and issue in the name
of the department notice of the hearings
or subpoenas requiring the testimony of
witnesses and the production of evidence
relevant to any matter in the hearing.
Utah Admin. Code R455-14-1(A)(9)(i)(5) (1967) also provides:
T h e f y | e s 0£

evidence as applied in civil
actions in the courts of this State shall
be generally followed in the hearings.
Any relevant evidence may be admitted if
it is the type of evidence commonly relied
upon by prudent men in the conduct of
their affairs. . . . Irrelevant,
immaterial and unduly repetitious evidence
shall be excluded.
In his proposed findings, the hearing officer explained I i s
ruling:
The State Plan does not contain • iipecific
definition of what it means to be
•efficiently and economically operated.*
Rather, the State has set rates for
payment for services that the State deems
•re reasonable and adequate and maintains
that en •efficiently end economically
operated facility* is one that is able to
operate it or below that standard. Such
•pprosch is proper under current lev.
In esplanations accompanying
regulations of the Department of Health
end Human Services, the Department

states:

We have also decided not to mandate
that the State plan specifically
provide a definition of an
•efficiently and economically
operated facility." The reason for
this is that the State's methods and
standards implicitly act as the
State's definition of an efficiently
and economically operated facility,
and no explicit definition is
necessary.
Because the "Modified Flat Kate9 is
applied uniformly statewide, and is the
standard by which all nursing homes are
measured, it was not necessary to examine
the specific costs of Weber Memorial Care
Center, Inc. to determine if it could be
more efficiently and economically operated
and that was not done.
Utah Code Ann. $ 26-23-2(3) (1987) states, "If the final
determination of the executive director is consistent with the
findings of fact and conclusions of law recommended by the
hearing officer, the court shall review the record and may
alter the final determination only upon a finding that the
final determination is capricious, or not supported by the
evidence." The executive director, in sustaining the hearing
officer, found that since the modified flat rate implicitly
defines an efficiently and economically operated facility,
evidence of Weber Memorial's costs and operation was irrelevant
and, therefore, inadmissible. We conclude the executive
director's final determination on this issue was not
capricious, but supported by the evidence.
Weber Memorial last argues the classification of patients
under the modified flat rate plan is capricious. Under the
plan, a health care provider routinely submits recommendations
for patient classifications to the Department. Department
officials consider these recommendations and other information
supplied by the providers in making final classifications.
Weber Memorial contends the Department arbitrarily classified
thirty-eight of Its patients as "intermediate" rather than
"skilled care.9 Skilled care patients, by definition, require
laore specialised care and receive a higher rate of
reimbursement.
Requests for reconsideration of patient classifications are
routinely granted by the Department, but Weber Memorial
presented no evidence that such requests were made for the

thirty-eight patients. Weber Memorial also failed to present
any evidence that the thirty-eight patients qualified as
skilled care patients. The only evidence Weber Memorial
presented in support of its claim is that the national
percentage of skilled care patients is higher than Utah's.
Such evidence is insufficient to convince this Court that the
•tate classification system is capricious. Section 26-23-2(3).
In conclusion, the modified flat rate plan for Medicaid
reimbursement is in full compliance with federal and state
law. The final determination of the executive director was not
capricious, but amply supported by the evidence. The final
judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. No costs
•warded.
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42 USCS fi 13Wa

TITLE

> STATES TOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS

$ 1396a. State plans for medical assistance
(a) Contents. A State phn for medical assistance must—
(13) provide—
(A)(i) for the inclusion of some institutional and some non-institutional care and services, and
(ii) for the inclusion of home health services for any individual
who, under the Slate plan, is entitled to skilled nursing facility
services, and
(B) in the case of individuals receiving aid or assistance under the
State's.jfchn approved under title 1, X, XIV, or XVI, or pan A of title
IV (42'USCS §§301-304, 306, 1201, 1202. 1203. 12W. 1206. 13511355, 138!-1363c, or 601-610], for the inclusion of at least the care
and services listed in clauses (1) through (5) of section 1905(a) [42
USCS §1396d(a)]. and
(C) in the case of individuals
the inclusion of at least—
(i) the care and services listed in clauses (1) through (5) of section
1905(a) (42 USCS § 1396d(a)(IM5)] or
(iiXI) the care and services listed in any 7 of the clauses numbered
(I) through (14) of such section [42 USCS § 1396d(a)(lMl<)] *nd
(II) in the event the care and services provided under the State
plan include hospital or skilled nursing facility services, physicians*
sen ices to an individual in a hospital or skilled nursing facility
during any period he is receiving hospital services from such
hospital or skilled nursing facility services from such home (facility), and
(D) for payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services
provided under the plan, as determined in accordance with methods
and standards, consistent with section 1122 (42 USCS § 1320a-1],
which shall be developed by the State and reviewed and approved by
the Secretary and (after notice of approval by the Secretary) included
in the plan, except that the reasonable cost of any such services as
determined under such methods and standards shall not exceed the
amount which would be determined under section I861(v) (42 USCS
11395x(v)] as the reasonable cost of such services for purposes of title
XVIII (42 USCS {§ 1395-1395b. 1395c-1395i, 13951-2, 1395j-1395w,
I395x-1395dd, I395FF-I395pp], and
(E) effective July 1, 1976, for payment of the skilled nursing facility
and intermediate care facility services provided under the plan on a
reasonable cost related basis, as determined in accordance with
methods and standards which shall be developed by the State on the
basis of cost-finding methods approved and verified by the Secretary,
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TITLE 42-THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND WELFARE
SUBCHAPTER XIX-CRANTS TO STATES
FOK MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
f I396u State plan* for medical aamtsnre
Ui Contents

A State plan for medical assistance must—
(13) provide—
(A) for payment (except where the SUte
agency is subject to an order under section
13<J6m of this title) of the hospital, skilled
nursing facility, and Intermediate care facility services provided under the plan
through the use of rates (determined in accordance with methods and standards developed by the State and which, in the case of
hospitals, take into account the situation of
hospitals which serve a disproportionate
number of low income patients with special
needs and provide, in the case of hospital
patients receiving services at an inappropriate level of care (under conditions similar to
those described in section 1395x(v)(l)(G) of
this title), for lower reimbursement rates reflecting the level of care actually received
(in a manner consistent with section
1395x(v)(l)(G) of this title)) which the
State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and
services in conformity with applicable State
and Federal laws, regulations, and quality
and safety standards and to assure that individuals eligible for medical assistance
have reasonable access (taking into account
geographic location and reasonable travel
time) to inpatient hospital services of adequate quality; and such State makes further
assurances, satisfactory to the Secretary.
for the filing of uniform cost reports by
each hospital, skilled nursing facility, and
Intermediate care facility and periodic
audits by the State of such reports; and
(B) for payment for services described In
section 1396d(aM2)(B) of this title provided
by a rural health clinic under the plan of
100 percent of costs which are reasonable
and related to the cost of furnishing such
services or based on such other tests of reasonableness, as the Secretary may prescribe
in regulations under section 1395/<a>(3) of
this title, or. in the case of services to which
those regulations do not apply, on such
f i t s of reasonableness as the Secretary
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•ECTION 22T—ItElMbtltSEMKNT RATKS UXDKII M1JUCAIO FOJt SKILLED
KUMSINO AND i.vrLKMLoi.m; CAKE IMCIMTIES
Present law requires States participating in medicaid to pay skilled
nurfing facilities (SXFs) ami intermediate care facilities (ICFs)
on a reasonable cost-related ban-. This requirement, added by Section
249(a) of the Social Security Amendment* of l!>7-\ was designed to
assure that payment rates would mote cloudy relied the reasonable
costs necessary to provide nursing home service.* of adequate quality.
Section 249(a) gives States the option of tiding medi« aireV reasonable
cost rcimbui>cmetit formula for purjMises of reimbursing SNFs and
I C F N or developing other reasonable cost-related metiutds of reimbursement acceptable lo the Secretary.
States have argued that the complex ami Jong-delayed Federal regulations implementing the statutory rctpiiremcnt of nation 2 l!)(a) have
unduly restrained their administrative ami fiscal discretion and thnt
the Federal approval process has forced States lo rely hea\ ily on medicare principles of reimbursement. Neither of these consequences iras
intended when KTC! ion 24!)(a) wu» enacted.
The committee continues to liclicvr that States should have flexibility in developing methods oflmymeiit for their mt*di<aid program*
and that application of the reasonable H H iviml»ui>cmcut principles
of the medicare program for long-term care fat ility set vices is not
entirely satisfactory. T h w principles arc inherently inflationary ami
contain no inccnti «* for cflit iml |M*I furmamv.
T I H * f o i i i l i i i t l t f h i l l deled** t h e p r o c n l l a n g u a g e o f section 1902
I n 111:t)I K t « f i h e a e i (%%hi« It u ; h n I d . d t.\ MM t••••• ^ | ! M a ) u f the 1»?J
' i • ' n l M f M a n d • • • ! • • • ! •!!••• !•••••••••••••• •* I •• li f i l e * flu* St a t«- flexibility
a n d J I T I C I M M I . »ohj<*i*| i n tin* • l a t i i l M t t • • •!•••• • i. i t ; ! 1 , #.f : ; . i - M ii«»*
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tnd the existing requirements of section 1!)02 (a) (30) and section 1121
of the Act, to formulate their own methods and standards of payment.
Under the bill* States would he free to establish rates on a statewide
or other geographic basis, a class basis, or an institution-by-institution
basis without reference to medicare principles of reimbursement. The
flexibility given the States is not intended to encourage arbitrary
reductions m payment that would adversely a licet the quality of care.
Under the bill, the State would be required to find, and make assurances .satisfactory to the Secretary that the payment rate*, taking
into account projected economic rnnditions during the period for
which the rate* are set are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs
which must bo incurred by eflicicntly and economically operated facilities in order to provide care and .services in conformity with applicable State and Federal laws, regulations and standard*. The State
would al>o lie require I to assure the Secretary that il has provided f«»r
the tiling by the facilities of uniform co>t reports ami for I heir periodic
audit by thu^tate.
The Congrc^ expects that the Secretary will keep regulatory ami
other requirements to that minimum necessary to assure proper accountability, and not to overburden the* State* and facilities with marginal but massive paperwork requirements. It is expected that the
assurance* made by the State?* will be considered .satisfactory in the
absence of a formal finding to the contrary by the Secretary.
In establishing rate.*, a State, at its option, could include incentive
allowances designed to encourage cost containment through cflicient
performance, as well as incentives to attract investment where such
investments would serve to alleviate demonstrated shortages of longterm care sei \ ire*. In addition. States would continue to have the option
provided in current Federal Kegulations to adjust rates downward for
facilities with service deficiencies where facilities are classed by quality
of Mivicr or level of rare.
The Secretary would be expected to continue to apply current regulations which renuire that payments made under State plans do not
exceed amounts which would be determined under the medicare principle* of reimbursement. Since States would be free under the bill to
establish payment rates without reference to medicare principles of
reimbursement, the Secretary would only be expected to com pan* the
average rates paid to SXFs participating in medicare with the average
rates paid to SNFs participating in medicaid in applying this limitation.
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BEFORE THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

In Re: WEBER MEMORIAL CARE
CENTER, INC., AND CHARTHAM
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
Plaintiffs,
PROPOSED DECISION,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
FINANCING,
Respondent.

This matter was heard on oral argument.

Having reviewed the

transcripts of that argument, the exhibits admitted into evidence (including
depositions taken herein), the inritten Final Arguments of the parties, the
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by counsel, and
applicable law, the hearing officer now submits the following Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Proposed Decision to the executive director
of the Department of Health in accordance with Rule 9 of the Administrative
Hearing Procedures.

SUMMARY OF ISSUES
The Plaintiffs contend that the Utah State Plan for payment to
Medicaid providers it defective because of the following:
(1) The flat rate system was predetermined by the budget
appropriated by the legislature of the State of Utah in 1981.
(2) No standards were set by the State of Utah relating to
efficient or economically operated facilities.
(3) No "assurances" eould be made to the Secretary of

2
HHS without appropriate findings being first made by
the State of Utah in accordance with 42 C.F.R. § 447.252(c)
and 447.255.
(4) The implementation of Utah of its definition of a
••skilled" patient for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement is
incorrect as to thirty-eight patients, at least, at the Weber
Memorial Care Center, and suggestive of arbitrary and capricious
State conduct.
Plaintiffs also defined the following issues:
1.

Because the State of Utah has chosen to carve out an exception

in the method of payment for services for the State Training School in
American Fork, all providers should be afforded the opportunity to qualify
for such an exception if good reasons exist for different treatment.
2.

That Michael Stapley, acting director of the Utah State

Department of Health is acting under color of state law and by so doing
has violated 42 USC 1983 and 1988.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The Plaintiff, Weber Memorial Care Center Inc., is an
Oregon corporation with its principal place of business in Roy, Utah,
and is engaged in the principal business of providing longterm healthcare
to the aged.
2.

The Plaintiff, Chartham

Management, Inc., is an Oregon

corporation which provides management services to Weber Memorial Care
Center, Inc.
3. The Respondent, the State of Utah, Department of Health,
Is the single state agency responsible for administering the Title XIX
Medical Assistance Program within the state of Utah.

Title XIX of the

Social Security Act, as amended, is generally known as ••Medicaid" and
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establishes and governs the program for medical assistance to the indigent
and developmentally disabled through the means of a cooperative effort
between each of the participating states and the United States of America.
The programs thus established are known generically as medical assistance
programs.
4.

Prior to 1981, the State of Utah reimbursed longterm healthcare

facilities participating in the Medicaid program on a cost-related reimbursement
schedule.

Essentially, facilities would report their costs to the State

of Utah, and, depending upon the state-determined propriety and necessity
of those costs, they would be reimbursed in whole or in part.

This was

pursuant to the then current Utah state plan which had been approved by
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services.
5.

Section 961 of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980

(P.L. 96-499) deleted the medicaid requirement that skilled nursing
facility and intermediate care facility services, be reimbursed on a
reasonable cost related basis under standards and methods developed by
the state and approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS),
and in its place, effective October 1980, the law required that states
pay for these services on the basis of rates which the state finds, and
makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary of HHS, are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and
economically operated facilities in order to provide care in conformity
ifith applicable state and federal laws, regulations and quality and safety
standards.

This language is now codified at 42 U.S.C. 81396 (a) (13) (A)

and 42 C.F.R. |447.252 and colloqually referred to as the "Boren Amendment."
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6.

Thereafter, the United States Department of Health and

Human Services published regulations to implement said amendment, which
regulations are found at 42 C.F.R.Part 447 and are incorporated herein
by reference.
7.

The Senate Report accompanying the new langugage stated:

The committee continues to believe that states should
have flexibility in developing methods of payment for
their medicaid programs and that application of the reasonable
cost reimbursement principles of the medicare program for
longterm care facility services is not entirely satisfactory.
These principles are inherently inflationary and contain no
incentives for efficient performance.
The committee bill deletes the present language . • .
and substitutes language which gives the States flexibility
and discretion, subject to the statutory requirements of
this section, to formulate their own methods and standards
of payment.
Senate Report No. 96-471, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 4 Medicare and Medicaid Guide Paragraph 24,407, at 8780-81
(CCH) (1981).

8.

By letter, dated January 29, 1981, the Utah Health Care

Association, which represents nearly all the nursing homes in the State
of Utah, urged the State Legislature to endorse adoption of a system of
payment to nursing homes furnishing long term care to medicaid patients,
and defined 'the system as a "Modified Flat Rate" system,

The letter

represented that the system would return operating control to the owner
or administrator, would relate to the cost of efficient operation, and
would »eet the requirements of State and Federal regulations pertaining
to the medicaid program, and further that the system would be administratively less costly, and would virtually eliminate the potential for fraud
or abuse of the system.

The letter further represented the system had

5
been discussed with and approved by the State Department of Health, and
asked for representation on an ad hoc committee to review and assist in
the final development and approval of the specific elements of such a
program.

The letter then recommended a reduction in the nursing home

budget for FY 1982 in the amount of 1.4 million dollars.
9*
Department of

The State Legislature on January 30, 1981 directed the
Health to work with provider organizations in developing

such a system, and a committee was formed, known as the "Modified Flat
Rate Committee,•• and instructed to develop and ready the system for
implementation by July 1, 1981*

The committee consisted of a representative

from the legislature, a legislative analyst, the Executive Director of
the Department of Health, a medicaid reimbursement specialist, the Executive
Director of Utah Health Care Association, the President of the Utah
Health Care Association, and a representative of the industry (a nursing
home operator, not a member of the Health Care Association).
10.

The Modified Flat Rate Committee, hereinafter referred to

as the Committee, assisted by staff members of the Department of Health
and members of the health care industry, developed a system for payment
of a fee for services to providers, which system has become known as the
"modified flat rate9* system and is often referred to as the "flat rate"
system.
11.

Pursuant to said system, patients who qualify for Nedicaid

assistance are classed according to the degree of care needed, the potential
for rehabilitation, whether they are mentally retarded, etc.

The nursing

homes that render such services are to be paid a "flat rate M fee per
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patient per day according to the classification of such patient.

The

flat rate to be paid for patients within each classification is the same
statewide.
12.

The flat rate derived for each class of patient was based

on the most recent information on the actual costs being incurred by the
nursing home industry in the aggregate, as reported by each facility on
its 1980 "facility cost profile" (FCP); on comparison with the rates that
other states were paying for nursing home services in Federal Region 8;
on input from the Utah Health Care Association; on a trending factor on
the historical costs as recommended by Lewin and Associates, a consulting
firm that was retained by the State; on comparison with 1976 rates as
inflated forward; on the legislative budget allocation;
and on discussions and interactions on the Committee.

The budget alloca-

tion itself was based on costs for prior years, projected forward.
13.

The flat rate thus derived is inflated annually on the

basis of the Consumer Price Index for urban areas less mortgage interest
cost and is renegotiated with the industry annually.
14.

Huch of the discussion of the Committee centered around

the treatment of property costs because there are significant differences
in those costs between facilities and because of the opportunities to
abuse the system through real estate transactions.

In the letter mentioned

in paragraph 8 above, the Utah Health Care Association said the modified
flat rate system would "eliminate the incentive to engage in real estate
transactions for profit on sale or lease of facilities.*' Two dollars per
patient per day was added to the flat rate as partial compensation for
historical property costs and return on equity.

That amount is inflated
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annually with the flat rate to cover increases in property tax, insurance,
maintenance and contingencies.

In addition to the flat rate, each facility

also receives a "property differential*' as additional compensation for
property costs, which is unique to each facility and approximates threefifths of the property costs as of March 27, 1981.

Said property differential

is not inflated.
15.

The Committee did not do a facility by facility analysis

to determine whether each particular facility could be operated more
economically or efficiently.
16.

Congressional intent expressed in the Senate committee's

report statest

Under the bill, (the) State would be free to establish
rates on a statewide or other geographic basis, a class basis,
or an institution-by-institution basis, without reference to
medicare principles of reimbursement.
(See citation in paragraph 7 above.)

17*

Tht "Modified Flat Rate" methodology of payment was

properly taken through the rule making procedure, a public hearing was
held and there ware no objections from the industry.

It was submitted

to tht U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, who certified that
it satisfied tht rtquirtmtnts of the law, and that all assurances submitted
under tht rtquirtmtnts of tht act wtrt acceptable.

It was then adopted

into law aa an aiatndjatnt to tht atatt plan tfftctivt July 1, 1981.
18.

Tht Statt Plan dots not contain a aptcific definition of

what it »eana to bt "efficiently and economically operated.H

Rather,

tht Statt has att ratta for payment for atrvicta that tht Statt deems are
rtasonablt and adtquatt and maintains that an •'efficiently and economically
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operated facility" is one that is able to operate at or below that standard.
Such approach is proper under current law.
19.

In explanations accompanying regulations of the Department

of Health and Human Services, the Department states:
We have also decided not to mandate that the State plan
specifically provide a definition of an "efficiently
and economically operated facility." The reason for this
is that the State's methods and standards implicitly act
as the State's definition of an efficiently and economically
operated facility, and no explicit definition is necessary.
Moreover, States are best equipped to determine what is an
efficient and economically operated facility for its Medicaid
program and a prescriptive Federal definition would be
contrary to State flexibility. The term "efficiently
and economically operated facility" is one that has not been
precisely defined by the Congress, the Department or the
health care industry.
This decision is also consistent with our approach used for
other key statutory terms such as disproportionate numbers
of low income patients with special needs and reasonable
and adequate payment rates in which we have not provided
definitions. The use of a Federal definition would
infringe on the discretion of the State. With regard to the
latter term "reasonable.and adequate" it should be noted that
the term is not a precise number, but rather a rate which
falls within a range of what could be considered reasonable
and adequate.
(See 42 C.F.R. Part 447 Federal Register Vol. 48 No. 244,
Dec. 19, 1983 pp.56049).
20.

Because the "Modified Flat Rate" is applied uniformly

statewide, and is the standard by which all nursing homes are measured,
it was not necessary to examine the specific costs of Weber Memorial
Care Center, Inc. to determine if it could be more efficiently and
economically operated and that was not done.
21.

Over ninety percent of the long term care facilities in

Utah furnishing medicaid services are meeting their costs through the
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Nodified Flat Rate system.

The vast majority of those facilities are

showing a profit*
22.

At any given time there are several hundred vacant beds

in long term care facilities

throughout the State, though no showing

was made as to the geographical location of such beds.
23.

Plaintiff Weber Memorial Care Center was organized and the

facility purchased after the "Modified Flat Rate" methodology was in
place and operating.
24.

The classifications of required level of care into which

Medicaid patients are placed by the State of Utah include skilled, intermediate and three classes of intermediate mentally retarded.
25.

In making a determination into which classification a

particular patient should be placed, doctors and nurses at the Department
of Health consider the recommendations of the patient* attending physician.
the recommendation of the nursing home where that patient will reside
and detailed information supplied by the attending physician and the
nursing home on forms provided by the Department of Health.

The doctors

and nurses at the Department of Health do not examine the patient themselves.
26.

The long term care facilities do not have a right to appeal

the classification made by the Department of Health but may request a
reconsideration of the classification, which is routinely honored.

It

was not clear from the evidence presented whether such a request was made
for any of the thirty-eight patients that Plaintiffs contend are not
properly classified.
27.

The patient and/or the patient's next of kin and/or guardian

have the right to appeal the classification made by the Department of

10
Health.

If such appeal is made the informal hearing is generally held at

the facility where the patient resides.

The record indicates that none

of the thirty-eight patients that are claimed to be wrongly classified
filed such an appeal.
28.
others.

Within each class, some patients require more care than

In setting the rate to be paid for patients in each class, the

State derived an average rate based upon the costs of the various levels
of care within that class.
29.

The Utah State Medicaid definition of skilled care is as

follows:

MEDICARE (TITLE XVIII)/MEDICAID (TITLE XIX)
CRITERIA FOR SKILLED NURSING FACILITY
The care required and received by the patient must meet the
following criteria:
1.

A skilled service (at least one)
a.
be
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Skilled nursing
Skilled physical therapy
Skilled speech therapy
Skilled occupational therapist
Skilled respiratory therapy
Skilled management of an aggregate of unskilled services
Skilled services required to maintain a patient's
condition (to prevent deterioration),
and

2.

On a daily basis
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Skilled nursing - 7 days a week
Skilled physical therapy * 5 days per week by a
licensed physical therapist
Skilled speech therapy by a licensed speech therapist
Skilled occupational therapy by a licensed
occupational therapist
Skilled respiratory therapy
Combination of different services on different
days may meet "daily" requirement.

and
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3.

As a practical matter, the daily skilled services must be
rendered in an impatient SNF setting. Certified for
both Medicare (Title XVIII) and Medicaid (Title XIX).

Said definition

is essentially the sane as the Title XVIII

Medicare definition except that the Medicare requirements that skilled
services must commence within 30 days of a hospital discharge is not a
requirement, and that care must be related to a minimum acute hospital
stay of three days is not a requirement.

The Medicare age requirement

also does not apply.
30.

There is insufficient evidence in the record to warrant

a finding that any of the thirty-eight patients claimed to be improperly
classified meet the requirements to be classified for skilled care.
31.

The State Training School is a unique facility that

provides unique services and care.

It is therefore proper that the State

Training School be treated differently as to payment for services.

The

methodology for payment to the State Training School went through
appropriate rulemaking procedures, is contained in the State plan, and was
approved by the Federal Government.

There is nothing in the record to

support a finding that Plaintiffs provide unique services or would otherwise qualify for exceptional treatment.
32.

There is nothing In the record to support a claim of a

civil rights violation either by James Mason, former director of the
Department of Health, or by defendant Michael Stapley, acting in his
official capacity as acting director of the Department of Health.

Michael

Stapley played no role in the development or promulgation of the •'Modified
Flat Rate- methodology.

He was appointed acting director after the

"Modified Flat Kate" methodology was promulgated into law.
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33.

Plaintiffs have failed to show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the "Modified Flat Rate Committee" or the Department of
Health acted arbitrarily or capriciously in the development and
promulgation of the "Modified Flat Rate" ^methodology of payment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The "Modified Flat Rate" methodology of paying providers

for furnishing long term care services to Medicaid patients in the State
of Utah, and as set forth in the State Plan, complies with all provisions
of Federal and State Law.
2.

Neither the "Modified Flat Rate Committee", nor the Depart-

ment of Health nor any other defendant herein acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
contrary to the law in the development, implementation, and/or operation
of the ••Modified Flat Rate" methodology of paying providers for services
rendered to Medicaid patients.
3.

Defendants James Mason and Michael Stapley did not violate

Plaintiffs* civil rights.
4.

Dated this

Plaintiffs9 petition must be dismissed.

20** of May, 1985.

Brian L. Farr, J.D.
Hearing Officer

ADDENDUM

G

STATE Of UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

N 0 8 V A N - BANG6BTEB GOVE*
SUZANNE OANOO* M 0

M » ~

EXECUTIVE DiBEt

BEFORE THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
In Re: WEBER MEMORIAL CARE
CENTER, INC., AND CHARTHAM
MANAGEMENT, INC.,
FINAL DETERMINATION
Plaintiffs,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE
FINANCING,
Respondent.
Having reviewed the recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the duly appointed Administrative Hearing
Officer in the above entitled matter, a copy of which is attached
hereto and incorporated herein, and having found that they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record,
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
That the aforementioned recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law be, and hereby are, sustained, and that the
Hearing Officer's recommended decision be, and hereby is, affirmed.
An appeal from this final determination may be secured
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.. Section 26-23-2 (1953 and Supp. 1983) by
filing a petition in the appropriate Oistrict Court of the State of
Utah within 30 days after this final determination is

AnnpnHnm ft-1

received.

Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time

limit may constiture a waiver of any right to appeal this
determination,
DATED this

oay of June, 1985.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

SUZANNE^OANDOY, M .D.. M.P
Executive Director

